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Continuing Duty to Warn: 
Public Policy and Managerial Views 
Karl A. Boedecker, Fred W. Morgan, 
and Allen B. Saviers 
The authors explicitly consider the public policy issues related to the question of post-sale 
warnings and offer suggestions on how marketers should handle these issues. 
The topic of post-sale warnings is fraught with uncer- 
tainty and trade-offs. Commentators note that compa- 
nies encounter several difficulties meeting their post- 
sale warning responsibilities (Jacobs 1992; Schwartz 1983; 
Van Kirk 1989) and that it might be easier to fulfill time-of- 
sale warning obligations (Matula 1996). In his article in this 
issue of the Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, Schwartz 
(1998) addresses three important topics with regard to post- 
sale warnings: (1) whether marketers should have a post- 
sale duty to warn; (2) given that the draft version of the 
Restatement of the Law of Torts: Products Liability (1997) 
includes a post-sale duty to warn, what is the appropriate 
nature and scope of such duty; and (3) under what circum- 
stances should a marketer have to undertake a product 
recall? 
He considers these issues in the context of both the Model 
Uniform Product Liability Act (1979) and the American 
Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Torts: Products 
Liability (1997) project.' Schwartz states that marketers 
should have a post-sale duty to warn, albeit a limited one. 
The nature of this duty should be fault based and grounded 
in traditional negligence concepts rather than strict liability. 
He describes approvingly its narrowly drawn scope in the 
draft Restatement and advises that a company should have a 
"company-wide protocol," a contingency plan for assessing 
the need for post-sale warnings. He concludes that when 
marketers undertake voluntary product recalls, they should 
be shielded from liability, unless they act recklessly in doing 
so. Throughout his article, Schwartz maintains a managerial 
perspective by focusing on the implications of these policy 
issues for managers. He does, however, raise a public policy 
concern when he questions the fairness of what he labels 
"hindsight jurisprudence," that is, holding a company 
responsible for product dangers, unrecognized before the 
product launch, that come to light afterwards. 
Our objectives in this comment are to (1) consider explic- 
itly the important public policy issues related to the question 
of post-sale warnings and (2) offer some additional sugges- 
tions about how marketing managers should handle post- 
sale warnings and recalls. 
Public Policy Issues Inherent in the 
Question of Post-Sale Warnings 
In a society that enjoys a highly developed economy with 
many technologically complex products, a certain number 
of product-related injuries are inevitable. Consumers have 
become accustomed to a continuing cycle of new products, 
and companies compete with one another to be the first to 
provide these new offerings. This interaction raises two key 
public policy issues: 
1. Allocating the risks of product-related injuries. Who should 
bear those risks and in what proportions? 
2. Apportioning the losses from product-related injuries. At one 
extreme, marketers would bear these losses in the form of 
absolute tort liability, that is, having to pay the total cost of 
any such injuries, regardless of fault or product defect. At the 
other extreme, consumers themselves would absorb these 
losses without any legal recourse against marketers. (Insur- 
ance has a key role here, but on whom should premium costs 
fall-marketers or consumers? Placing those insurance costs 
on marketers might cause them to raise prices accordingly, 
thereby effectively shifting that burden onto product pur- 
chasers. This is now a widespread practice.) 
Moreover, we live in a society with a sophisticated mar- 
keting and distribution system, in which many businesses, 
often far removed from and beyond the awareness of con- 
sumers, perform various marketing functions as part of the 
distribution channel. Under these circumstances, what poli- 
cies will provide maximum incentives for marketers to take 
active roles in maintaining product safety throughout the 
stream of commerce? 
Public Policy Issues with Regard to Warnings 
The public policy underlying current law requires that prod- 
ucts sold to consumers must be safe in terms of design, man- 
ufacture, and warnings, with warnings acting as a compen- 
satory factor for products that cannot be designed to be com- 
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pletely safe.2 Warnings must be given to consumers when 
the product is dangerous in a manner that is not readily 
determinable by examining it or by using it in a foreseeable 
manner, even one unintended by the marketer. These princi- 
ples lead to three important considerations. How hidden, or 
latent, is the danger? How severe is the danger? What prod- 
uct uses or misuses are foreseeable? 
Each of these questions involves a judgment about the 
behavior of persons coming in contact with the product. The 
less obvious or more severe the danger, the greater the duty 
to warn. To the extent that a product use is foreseeable, 
regardless of whether it is intended by the seller, a warning 
must accompany the product. Because of the difficulty in 
identifying the "bright line" that separates situations that 
require warnings from those that do not, companies tend to 
err on the side of caution, and warnings proliferate (Fuller 
1997; Rechtschaffen 1996; Tyson 1987), which leads to 
information overload (Weissman 1996; Zeckhauser and 
Viscusi 1990). 
Before products reach the marketplace, companies are in 
a position to anticipate unusual uses through product test- 
ing, test marketing, focus groups, and brainstorming ses- 
sions. If a firm should thereby discover uses that expose 
consumers to an unreasonable risk of harm, warnings can 
be appended to products to notify consumers not to engage 
in these dangerous practices. Or, more fundamentally, 
products can be redesigned with, for example, warning 
sounds, deadman switches, restricted motions, or protective 
devices, so as to reduce the chances that consumers will use 
products incorrectly. 
When the firm learns of a product's dangerous propensi- 
ties after its introduction, the options available to the firm 
are limited and differ in scope and effectiveness: do nothing, 
warn current and future customers, or recall the product. 
Rare is the situation in which a company would take no 
action to respond to recently discovered product shortcom- 
ings. Even if the problem creates minor risks to consumers, 
a series of incidents could lower consumers' perceptions of 
the product and thereby reduce future sales. 
In determining whether to issue a post-sale warning, a 
firm is influenced by the laws and judicial decisions in the 
jurisdictions in which it operates, as well as by the recently 
issued Restatement of the Law of Torts: Products Liability 
(1997). The Restatement (1997, 10) provides four guide- 
lines for evaluating the continuing duty to warn (see also 
Lazarus et al. 1997; Wittner 1997): (1) the seller knows or 
reasonably should know that the product poses a substantial 
risk of harm to persons or property, (2) those to whom a 
warning might be provided can be identified and reasonably 
assumed to be unaware of the risk of harm, (3) a warning 
can be effectively communicated to and acted on by those to 
whom a warning might be provided, and (4) the risk of harm 
is sufficiently great to justify the burden of providing a 
warning. 
Each of these guidelines is explicated in the context of a 
reasonable person in the seller's position. But because the 
company is trying not only to "do the right thing," but also to 
avoid subsequent liability, the company must anticipate what 
a trier of fact (jury or judge) eventually might believe a rea- 
sonable person should do under the circumstances. 
The extent to which the marketer reasonably can be 
expected to learn about product-related problems is the crit- 
ical determination regarding the necessity for a post-sale 
warning. When regarded collectively as a distribution chan- 
nel, marketers are in a better position than consumers to 
know about and deal with product-related dangers. Many of 
these dangers are not tangible to consumers-they take the 
form of colorless, odorless, invisible substances. Or, they 
exist as apparently harmless everyday objects that can have 
carcinogenic effects over time, such as asbestos fibers, toxic 
emissions, or radiation. The company is better equipped 
than consumers, either at the time of sale or post-sale, to 
learn about a product's dangerous properties through testing. 
The only caveat regarding relative knowledge might be in 
situations that involve corporate consumers, for example, a 
company that purchases industrial equipment for use in 
making the products it sells. But here the user's knowledge 
might be, at best, equivalent to that of the salespeople and 
designers of the equipment. It is difficult to imagine a situa- 
tion in which product users are clearly more informed about 
product-related dangers than product marketers. 
If the seller claims not to have known about dangerous 
product features, the issue becomes one of constructive 
knowledge (i.e., did the seller have reason to know). A mar- 
keting organization with standard research and testing facil- 
ities will have a difficult time convincing a trier of fact that 
it was unaware of product-related dangers. 
The issue of seller knowledge involves the notion of hind- 
sight jurisprudence that Schwartz raises. The cornerstone 
tort principle of foreseeability, often assessed according to 
what a reasonable marketer "knew or should have known" 
at the time of product sale, invokes the notion of hindsight 
because this determination occurs after a claim has been 
made. Thus, such judgments inevitably entail hindsight. 
Allocating responsibility by applying a standard that 
assesses whether a party possessed appropriate knowledge 
seems both fair and desirable. A trier of fact should be 
allowed to determine whether the marketer's actions were 
reasonable in light of what it knew or should have known 
before placing the product into the stream of commerce. 
The absence of a hindsight knowledge standard could 
lead to situations in which defendants are exonerated 
because they were unaware of product-related dangers due 
to inadequate product testing. Sound public policy involves 
providing incentives (penalties) for companies to know 
whether their products are safe before offering them for sale. 
2A critical public policy question not fully discussed in this analysis is 
the relationship between design and warnings. The core questions is: To 
what extent should legally adequate warnings be allowed to offset unsafe 
product designs? For many products, the dangers cannot be "designed 
away." For example, many pharmaceutical products are safe if the pre- 
scribed dosages are ingested. The only way to prevent overdosing is to sell 
single doses; however, this would be inconvenient and expensive. So drug 
products are marketed with warnings regarding proper dosages. The design 
versus warning trade-off actually involves a third factor: cost of an 
absolutely safe design-if such a design exists. 
The same issues arise in the batting helmet example raised by Schwartz. 
Children seem to be willing to do almost anything. A prudent manufacturer 
might attempt to issue warnings that address any and all unintended uses, 
that is, anything not related to the act of batting in the context of playing or 
practicing baseball. A question that is more perplexing as a public policy 
matter is whether such a manufacturer should be relieved of liability 
because its attorneys drafted a thorough warning that the children either 
cannot or do not read and retain. 
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The following hypothetical example illustrates several of 
these post-sale warnings and repair issues. 
A Hypothetical Case Example 
Soda Bottling Company (Soda) bottles and distributes sev- 
eral brands of soft drinks. Soda has purchased and used sev- 
eral different models of vending machines, including those 
manufactured by the Vend-O Company. In September 1997, 
Soda receives a letter from Vend-O regarding safety prob- 
lems with some of Vend-O's machines. Vend-O's letter 
states that (1) at least some of its machines have a tendency 
to dispense a can of cola when tilted or rocked and (2) sev- 
eral accidents have occurred when its machines have been 
tipped over on to people, resulting in serious injuries and 
deaths. Enclosed with the letter is a sample warning label 
decal, along with an offer to send Soda as many warning 
decals as it needs. Vend-O further offers to sell (at cost) 
safety kits to all its customers to secure the machines to 
walls or floors, thereby eliminating the risk of tip-over. Soda 
decides not to use any of Vend-O's warning decals and also 
declines to order any safety kits. 
In November 1997, a 17-year-old high school student 
rocks one of Soda's vending machines, which tips over and 
crushes him. The machine was manufactured by Quick- 
serve, but it uses the same generic mechanical design as the 
model made by Vend-O and about which Vend-O wrote the 
warning letter. The machine improperly allows a drink to be 
dispensed when the machine is tilted. 
The deceased teenager's estate sues both Soda and Quick- 
serve under several product liability claims. During the trial, 
evidence is presented by other students that it was well- 
known at the school that this particular machine would (1) 
often dispense a free drink when the machine was rocked or 
tilted and (2) sometimes fail to dispense a drink when the 
full purchase price was properly deposited. However, it is 
unclear from the students' testimony whether the decedent 
had deposited money into the machine. 
The plaintiffs mechanical engineering expert testifies 
that the vending machine model in question looks stable to 
the average layman but is in fact highly unstable because of 
a "top-heavy" design that allows it to be pushed over sur- 
prisingly easily. In addition, the expert states that when the 
machine is tilted and dispenses a free drink, the next paying 
customer buys an empty space and receives no product. The 
same expert opines that the machine's combination of ten- 
dencies has the effect of entrapping both paying and non- 
paying customers into rocking the unstable machine. 
Another important witness is Soda's technician, who ser- 
vices the machines at the high school. The technician testifies 
that he has received several complaints from school officials 
regarding the machine's propensity to take money without 
dispensing the paid-for drink. According to his testimony, the 
technician explained to school officials that the machine was 
not broken and that the problem was with people tilting the 
machine to get free drinks. The solution, he told the school, 
was to either bolt the machine down or attach warning stick- 
ers to it. However, the technician made no effort to do either. 
Analysis of Soda's liability appears to fit well in the post- 
sale duty to warn as set forth in the new Restatement (1997). 
Several factors indicate that Soda knew of a foreseeable risk 
of harm to its customers, yet failed to take measures to pre- 
vent it. On receiving the letter from Vend-O, Soda had 
actual knowledge of a dangerous condition associated with 
the purchase of its product from machines that it owned. The 
customers at risk included a target market comprised of 
minors on their high school premises, a group notoriously 
insensitive to risks associated with what they perceive as 
"routine highjinks." Furthermore, a Soda employee had 
acknowledged to school officials both the propensity of its 
machines to take money without dispensing a drink and that 
people could obtain free drinks by tilting the machines. The 
technician apparently made no effort to see that school offi- 
cials took any subsequent action. Soda would be liable. 
Quickserve's liability is less certain under the new 
Restatement standard. Quickserve's actual knowledge of the 
risks posed by its vending machines is unclear under these 
facts. Suppose that it did not know of either its machines' 
instability or their tendency to dispense cans when rocked or 
tilted. Should it have known of these defects before offering 
them for sale to bottlers such as Soda? If not, should it have 
become aware of them after having sold them but before the 
claim occurred? The new Restatement would impose a post- 
sale duty to warn on Quickserve if the company knew or 
should have known after the time of sale or distribution that 
the product posed a substantial risk of harm to persons or 
property. That question can be answered only after a claim 
is made, that is, in hindsight. 
In any event, another manufacturer that used the same 
design has discovered the dangerous condition and warned 
Soda. If Vend-O could discover this, why couldn't Quick- 
serve? Furthermore, Vend-O's offers of warning labels and 
a safety kit to Soda make it likely that the vending machine 
instability problem had become known to the industry. Cer- 
tainly Quickserve should have been aware of it by then. 
In a case similar to this hypothetical case, the defendants, 
the bottler and vending machine manufacturer, were granted 
summary judgment by a North Carolina trial court (Morgan 
v. Cavalier Acquisition Corporation 1993). However, a 
state appellate court reversed this decision, stating that, 
among other issues, there were genuine questions regarding 
whether the defendants should have warned about the vend- 
ing machine's instability.3 
The outcome hinges on whether it is believed that Soda 
should be held accountable for knowing about a misuse of its 
product and not issuing post-sale warnings or installing safety 
devices to try to forestall the misuse. If Soda is allowed to 
invoke the "no hindsight" defense, then Soda is exculpated. 
How Marketing Managers Should 
Handle Post-Sale Warnings and Recalls 
When a marketing manager first learns about a product- 
related risk of harm after the launch, his or her initial step 
3In another similar case, the defendants were granted summary judgment 
because they could show that the plaintiff was trying to steal a soft drink 
from the vending machine (Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of 
Decatur Inc. 1993). In Alabama, as in many states, someone cannot bring 
a cause of action based all or in part on an illegal act. The dissenting opin- 
ion in Oden, more than twice the length of the majority opinion, would 
have allowed a jury to determine if Pepsi should have provided warnings 
on its vending machines. 
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should be to assess the potential dangers. This involves 
immediate contact with distributors, retailers, and con- 
sumers to learn about the number and frequency of inci- 
dents, the severity of harm (both actual and potential), the 
surrounding circumstances, and any unanticipated product 
uses. The results may indicate a need for additional product 
testing, beyond what the firm did prior to the introduction, 
that takes into account newly discovered conditions and 
uses. If the firm subsequently determines a need for product 
redesign or reformulation or a change in manufacturing 
processes, it should consider undertaking a product recall. In 
situations in which both the risk of injury and severity of 
harm are low, a post-sale warning might suffice. 
These alternatives are not mutually exclusive. A proac- 
tive firm can choose to issue immediate warnings while it 
organizes and implements a recall campaign. 
The firm must decide whether it has a duty to warn or 
recall. This requires weighing the gravity and scope (num- 
ber of persons and value of property affected) of the risk, the 
timing and substance of the firm's knowledge, the extent to 
which the firm has asserted actual or constructive control 
over the product, and the ability of the firm to remedy the 
defect. 
A proactive response by Soda, upon learning of Vend-O's 
warning and safety kit offer, would have been to accept 
Vend-O's offer of warning labels and have its own person- 
nel attach them to their vending machines as soon as possi- 
ble. In addition, Soda should have worked with high school 
officials to provide additional warnings to students through 
announcements, bulletin board notices, the student newspa- 
per, and any other available means of communications.4 
Soda also should have undertaken an immediate inspection 
of all its vending machines to determine the necessity and 
feasibility of attaching them to walls or floors or otherwise 
securing them. 
A proactive response by Quickserve would have been to 
devise and dispense warnings immediately to its machine 
purchasers, both past and current. It needed to spread the 
word about this potential misuse of its product as quickly as 
possible throughout the industry. The company also should 
have offered information and assistance to its customers 
regarding the advisability and means of stabilizing its 
machines. If retrofitting was not possible, Quickserve 
should have considered a product recall. Over the long term, 
product redesign appears inevitable. 
Protocols for Product Recalls 
The scope and difficulty of a product recall campaign 
depend on the nature of the market and the distribution chan- 
nel that leads to it. At one extreme, in which the firm deals 
with a small number of readily identifiable customers (e.g., 
the Space Shuttle or jumbo jet aircraft, such as DC-10s), 
notification is straightforward. For motor vehicles, a manda- 
tory, government-maintained registration system enables 
marketers to reach virtually 100% of product owners. 
Other products pose greater challenges. Although mar- 
keters of such items as home appliances, consumer elec- 
tronics, and power tools often encourage purchasers to reg- 
ister the items, not all consumers do so. Whenever possible, 
marketers should maintain customer databases that include 
model and serial numbers, addresses, and dates of purchase. 
Likewise, marketers should maintain such records for their 
distribution channels. Modern information technology 
makes the development and maintenance of such manage- 
ment information systems both technically possible and eco- 
nomically feasible. 
When such information systems are not feasible, as is the 
case for many convenience goods, such as household clean- 
ing products, over-the-counter pharmaceuticals, and pack- 
aged foods, marketers should track achieved distribution by 
geographic area and retail outlets. Again, the technology 
exists to do this with universal product codes and wide- 
spread checkout scanning of retail transactions. This cap- 
tures the necessary data at the point of sale and allows ready 
access to it. Not long ago, the best that marketers could do 
in this regard were store audits and consumer surveys--dif- 
ficult, time-consuming, and of questionable accuracy. 
Development and Dissemination of Post-Sale 
Warnings 
When marketers discover an unanticipated product hazard 
after the product's introduction, time is likely to be of the 
essence in communicating a warning to users. Such pressure 
might preclude the sort of warning tests that prudent mar- 
keters otherwise should conduct as a standard part of the 
product development process, much as they test advertising 
messages and alternative media delivery plans. 
At the very least, however, marketers should consider not 
only message content and how the target audience will per- 
ceive it, but also the likelihood that the warning will reach 
the users. For consumer products, this raises questions of 
how strongly to word the message, whether to provide it in 
languages other than English (or use symbols), what com- 
munication media to use, how much to budget for advertis- 
ing and other communication efforts, and how long the 
warning campaign should run. Although specific decisions 
will depend on the particular facts and circumstances 
involved, the marketer's original promotional expenditures 
and the length of the campaign preceding discovery of the 
defect are bound to weigh heavily in determining what con- 
stitutes a reasonable post-sale warning effort. 
Determining the appropriate target audience for a post- 
sale warning involves particularly significant, and difficult, 
problems. For many consumer products, the purchaser is not 
necessarily the sole user. Many household members other 
than the registered owner of a motor vehicle also might use 
it. Neighbors commonly borrow tools. Professional house- 
cleaners use products purchased by their clients. Thus, a 
warning addressed to the purchaser may not reach the user, 
especially if the warning appears on the package or in the 
instructions that the buyer discards before the user sees it. 
Similar problems arise with industrial products. Schwartz 
states that notifying employers about hazards associated 
with tools and machinery used in manufacturing should suf- 
fice to absolve industrial goods marketers from responsibil- 
ity for product-related defects that cause injury to users. 
4Although it does not fall within the post-sale duty to warn or recall 
issues, the high school would have liability for the claim because it was on 
notice of an unreasonably dangerous condition on its premises, yet failed to 
act. 
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This assumes that employers will pass along warnings to 
their employees effectively. For a variety of reasons, rang- 
ing from simple oversight to a belief that such wamrnings 
would inhibit or impede worker productivity, employers 
might fail to do so. Indeed, any employer that does not act 
reasonably to convey such wamrnings to its employees 
nonetheless has the protection of the workers' compensation 
system, which severely restricts the employer's obligation 
to make the injured worker whole. In instances in which 
effectively conveying the warning to workers would lead to 
changes in workplace practices that affect productivity 
adversely, employers would have an economic incentive to 
dilute the warning or not communicate it at all. 
Conclusion 
If marketers are not held accountable for communicating 
safety-related information learned after their products are 
marketed and sold, consumers continually will be subject to 
dangers about which they could have been warned. The 
product marketer is usually in the best position in the distri- 
bution channel to learn about post-sale problems with a 
product through communications with resellers and con- 
sumers. The marketer then can determine how best to pass 
this safety-related information on to current and prospective 
product users. 
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